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From her childhood, Ginsburg recognized the reality of gender inequity as well as other forms of inequality. Her biographers write, “[F]rom a young age, Ruth also resented what she saw as sometimes rigid adherence to seemingly hypocritical rules and the inferior role assigned to women” (15). At age 13, when Ginsburg penned articles not only for her school newspaper but also for the Jewish community’s newsletter, she found herself excluded from the bar mitzvah ceremony that the 13-year-old Jewish boys participated in as a rite of passage. Her acute awareness of the misuse of power came to the fore during her college matriculation, when she challenged the prevailing, popular use of wiretapping, the newest tech tool, conducted without legal warrants. In a letter to the Cornell Daily Sun, she wrote: “[I]n our system of justice, the presumption of innocence is prime, and the law cannot apply one rule to Joe who is a good man, and another to John, who is a hardened criminal” (23). During her time at Cornell, studying under constitutional scholar Robert Cushman, her career focus fell onto social justice when Cushman challenged Ginsburg to pursue the law.
Ginsburg’s early area of legal expertise was procedural law. As a result, she became well acquainted with the history of jurisprudence, acquiring not only an encyclopedic knowledge of the US federal and state judicial systems but also a purview of how other nations conduct the rule of law. Spending time in Sweden to study an entirely new set of domestic laws, Ginsburg encountered the concept of vägmärken, meaning “waypaving” or “pathmarking.” Applying this concept historically, she recognized women who came before her who sought to establish social and legal pathways to gender equality. While teaching procedural law as a professor at Rutgers, Ginsburg made her first noteworthy legal challenge against gender inequality when she wrote a brief for Reed v. Reed, a case in which a state law arbitrarily chose a man rather than a woman to dispose of a deceased son’s belongings. Ginsburg’s brief made it to the Supreme Court, the first of 24 briefs written by Ginsburg dealing primarily with gender inequity that the justices would read.
As the legal momentum built around needed revisions of laws and constitutional interpretations, Ginsburg expanded the base of her support. Moving to Columbia, where she became the first tenured woman law professor, with the aid of the ACLU, she founded the Woman’s Rights Project in 1972. Ginsburg notes in several comments throughout the text that the women’s movement, while never as dangerous or controversial as the civil rights movement, learned valuable lessons from those pursuing civil rights that came into play in the struggle for gender equality. In 1973, for the first time Ginsburg personally argued a case before the Supreme Court. She would participate in oral arguments before the court five more times before President Carter nominated her to join the DC Circuit Court of Appeals.
Even as sitting judge, and later as a justice, Ginsburg never lost her fervor for seeking gender equality. As she said to the Senate Judicial Committee prior to her confirmation hearings, “[W]e could not have come to this point—and I surely would not be in this room today—without the determined efforts of men and women who kept dreams of equal citizenship alive in days when few would listen” (183). Accordingly, Ginsburg said that, as a justice, one moment of great satisfaction came when she read the bench announcement proclaiming that the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) could no longer exclude women students. Despite her many legal victories and the concurrent social changes, she expresses the recognition that gender equality remains an unfulfilled aspiration.
When Ginsburg took her place in the White House Rose Garden to accept President Clinton’s nomination for the Supreme Court and again when she gave her opening remarks to the Senate Judiciary Committee, before she spoke of any substantive issue, she expressed gratitude to the individuals whom she believed helped bring her to that moment. While observers would expect such statements from an individual receiving recognition of such magnitude, Ginsburg went beyond perfunctory comments to explain why she was grateful to each of the individuals she thanked. For example, when she spoke of her husband, Marty, she said, “I have had the great fortune to share life with a partner […] who believed at age 18 when we met, and who believes today, that a woman’s work, whether at home or on the job, is as important as a man’s” (182). Likewise, throughout the text, the author details the important contributions of others in her life, including her professors, family members, clients, colleagues, and fellow justices.
Beyond these current members of her life circle, however, Ginsburg describes her keen awareness that she owes a debt to “waypavers” who lived and died before her. Repeatedly she mentions historic US jurists like John Marshall; the previous Jewish justices, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Felix Frankfurter; and those she calls “founders,” such as Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. She also recognizes, to the extent that she can learn their stories, the trailblazing work of certain women, movers and shakers who were neither elected nor appointed. She writes of Malvina Harlan, the wife of Justice John Harlan, who not only indulged several hundred house guests weekly but grasped how to inspire her husband to write a spirited defense of equality. Ginsburg writes in admiration of those women who came before her, working for suffrage and equality, like Belva Lockwood and Emma Lazarus. The author refers to these forebears as her examples and inspirers.
Ginsburg’s aspirations were never for self-aggrandizement or the adulation of masses of people. Her goal was to continue with what she called the court’s main thrust: “to repair fractures in the federal law, to step in when other courts have disagreed on what the relevant federal law requires” (xix). Her life’s work, once she attained the status of justice, was to continue building toward the “more perfect union” aspired to in the Preamble to the Constitution. Thus, though she did not overtly intend it, Ginsburg herself became a “waypaver,” someone whose multiple examples of work, writing, and cordiality blaze a new trail for her colleagues, like Hartnett and Williams, her law students, and those who read her words.
Supreme Court justices, according to Ginsburg, work to cultivate collegiality. To demonstrate this reality, the author points out several times in the text that, in each annual term, they achieve a fairly high percentage of unanimous decisions. Still, because sharp disagreements often occur between members of the court, she acknowledges that a basic disagreement in the understanding of the principles of the Constitution exists on the current court. Commentators routinely describe this disagreement in terms of liberal versus conservative. Conventional opinion holds that during their shared time of service Justice Ginsburg embodied the liberal court, while Justice Scalia embodied the conservative court. This does not, however, reflect Ginsburg’s understanding. As she says during her remarks prior to her confirmation hearing: “My approach, I believe, is neither liberal nor conservative. Rather, it is rooted in the place of the judiciary, of judges, in our democratic society” (184). Recognizing that terms like liberal and conservative are political descriptions, Ginsburg goes on to express the idea that the judiciary should isolate itself from the whims and pressures of politics.
The biographers point out that their difference was not that she was liberal and Justice Scalia was conservative. The division between their principles that resulted in such extremely different viewpoints arose from their different understandings of the Constitution itself:
[The difference concerned] the spectrum between ‘originalists’—adherents to what they perceive as the founders’ original understanding of the Constitution—and those who espouse a ‘living constitution,’ whose fundamental principles should be interpreted in light of changing circumstances the founders could not have imagined (195).
Scalia was the epitome of the originalist, who perceived that justices should not interpret the Constitution so much as obey it. Ginsburg, on the other hand, recognized that the nation and society evolved over the centuries and that the amendments were an indication that the Constitution was changing in response. She quotes Professor Norman Dorsen’s citing of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who denied the originalist idea that “the great clauses of the constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, which the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them” (229). Throughout the text, Ginsburg reflects on the way that the changing society corresponds to enlarged understandings of the principles that guided the framers of the Constitution. She expresses the need for patience, even though equality is not yet fully realized. She insists that pleas for equal justice must continue until the American people are ready to hear them. Feminists did not make significant gains before the 1960s, she says, because “society was not prepared to heed their plea” (xvi). Thus, she believes, as society continues to evolve, the living Constitution will evolve with it.
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